A CAUSE FOR ACTION FOR PARENTS OF CHILDREN SEXUALLY ABUSED ©
    by Stephen C. Rubino
   A condensed version of this article was published in the February 1996 edition of Trial Magazine.

            The scene is a common one, repeated in millions of homes during the third week of November. Thanksgiving for the Harrison family was an eagerly awaited family reunion. The festive mood was shattered shortly after dinner. In halting, tearful sobs, a 32-year old son confronts his father. The patriarch, a retired immigrant stone cutter, hears for the first time that his trusted friend, his confessor, the man who blessed and presided over his 40th wedding anniversary and baptized his children, "his" priest for the last 30 years, sexually assaulted his son for over 2 years while he was in 6th and 7th grades of St. Michael's school. The cauldron of emotions present in the room rivet all those that hear into stunned silence. Mesmerized by his son's almost surreal account, the father instinctively recognizes the ring of truth in the words spoken, but fights with every fiber not to believe it's possible. Practitioners in this most difficult niche can readily confirm that sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic priest is a tort that devastates the entire family unit. The is particularly true when the family is devout and regular participants in weekly masses and other religious gatherings.

            The cause of action on behalf of the parents for experiencing their child's emotional distress and enduring injury in their own right will be the focus of this article. Courts generally do not favor such a cause of action unless it is a derivative action specifically related to a minor's loss of services, earnings, or incurred medical expenses. The parent, rather than the child (unless the child is emancipated), is entitled to recover in an action for child sexual abuse for all expenses necessarily incurred in the healing or attempting to heal the damage caused by the abuse.

            The more difficult question presented by the Harrison family scenario is under what circumstances do the parents have a direct cause of action against the child's sexual abuser or his employer for injuries inflicted on his child. At present, based on the factual records before the Appellate Courts, the majority rule is that civil liability does not attach to the sexual abuser for emotional distress suffered by the parents upon learning their child has been sexually assaulted. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule, but cases allowing for recovery are still in the minority.

            The consistent thread running through all the majority decisions barring recovery for the parents' claim center on the failure of the parents to witness the outrageous conduct directed at the immediate family member. That absurd reasoning is particularly flawed when the nature of the relationship between a priest/parish and a parishioner is elucidated both in the pleading and in discovery. Most courts, while sympathetic to the mental anguish suffered by the parents of sexually abused children, implicitly or explicitly apply the rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 46(2) that only those who witness outrageous conduct directed at any immediately family member may recover. The Restatement does, however, contain a caveat which states, "The institute expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be other circumstances under which the actor may be subject to liability for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress".

            Courts that have denied recovery of a parents' claim for emotional distress typically involve a negligence setting and the perception of injury or lack thereof as opposed to an intentional sexual assault. For example, in New Jersey in the case of Portee v. Jaffe, 84 N.J. 88 (1980), the Supreme Court found that tortfeasors are liable for the severe emotional distress suffered by family members who witness the injury of loved ones. The court's reasoning was as follows:

            Our inquiry has led us to conclude that the interest in personal emotional stability is worthy of legal protection against unreasonable conduct. The emotional harm following the perception of death or serious injury of a loved one is just as foreseeable as the injury itself, for few persons travel through life alone. 84 N.J. at 101.

            Thus, in drawing its conclusions, and reshaping the contours of tort law in various state courts, the principle basis of liability is, once again, foreseeability. Foreseeability is the beginning point for tort liability in every jurisdiction. The next step with regard to the expansion of the common law relates to policy considerations underlying the proposed solution or remedy. If the key to liability is reasonable foreseeability, there is no question that the intentional torts committed against the minors would have direct and dramatic consequences to their parents and loved ones no matter when they found out. These consequences are inevitably far more egregious than those which might occur from mere negligent injury. Close examination of the Harrison scenario reveals two injuries. In plain words, a parent hurts when they see their children hurt no matter the age. It is a specific, direct injury related exclusively to what the parents can perceive through watching their child's emotional pain and suffering in dealing with the emotional sequelae and hearing the facts of the sexual assault. The second injury is the breach of trust and faith between the perpetrator and who he represents, and the parents of the victim. If duty is rooted in foreseeability, then a fact-sensitive pleading should thoroughly dissect the intensely personal and intimate relationship between the church as a whole, the perpetrator and the victim who was a parishioner and loyal follower of the Catholic Church as represented by his local parish. This painstaking analysis must include the parents' role during the religious training of their children and what the church represented in their lives.

            The historical gift of our founding fathers allows for the progression of the common law. In every jurisdiction throughout this nation courts have observed that the common law can expand the scope of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. If the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress is one that can expand, it stands to reason that in light of the development of public policy concerning child sexual abuse that the related tort of intentional infliction is at least equally expansive. When the precepts of common law have outlived their usefulness and begin to threaten the moral and social interests of society, they are rightly cast aside.

            Either through exceptions to the majority rule, or extension of liability, a small number of courts have recognized a cause of action for parents' recovery of damages from the abuser for emotional distress caused by the sexual abuse of their child.

                                                          Duty and Foreseeable Harm

            In Schurk, the Supreme Court of Washington recognized an exception to the general rule denying recovery for mental anguish and distress where the parents did not observe the sexual abuse of their child. The court held that the parents of the molested child had stated a cause of action for mental distress and anguish against the abuser. The court reasoned that since their claims against him were the based upon his willful and intentional molestations of their daughter, they were outside the rule denying recovery in cases where there has been no actual invasion of the parents' persons or security or a direct possibility thereof.

            The doctrine of liability for outrageous conduct causing extreme emotional distress was extended by the Supreme Court of Alaska to cover a third person who is foreseeably harmed by the conduct. Although the parents did not observe the visitor's alleged sexual molestation of their daughter, they were in close proximity to the visitor and their daughter when the alleged incident occurred and observed her extreme distress just after alleged assault occurred. The court concluded that the parents stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because it was reasonably foreseeable to the alleged abuser that the parents, being in close proximity, would be harmed by his actions.

            In Croft, the court also recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court held that it is the reasonable foreseeability to the defendant of harm to the plaintiff that generates the defendant's duty to exercise reasonable care. In cases where a duty to exercise reasonable care is shown, some courts have been willing to recognize a parental cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by sexual abuse of children. A psychotherapist who, when consulted to treat both mother and child, sexually molested the child, breached the duty of care owed to the mother, giving the mother standing to assert a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Parents of a minor child who was allegedly sexually abused while he was confined for psychiatric treatment stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, since the defendants might have owed a duty to the parents. Allegations of parents that they entrusted the defendant with the care of their minor daughter as a guest in his home and that the defendant allegedly sexually assaulted their daughter stated existence of a duty and breach of that duty for purposes of the parents' cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Although there was no express understanding between the parties, the court recognized a contract implied in law with the condition that one entrusted with the care of a minor child by her parents would not assault the child. Despite the fact that they did not witness the abuse, where a duty of reasonable care is shown, parents may sometimes be able to recover from the abuser of their child for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In every case against a Catholic priest and his employer, duty must be examined not only with regard to the perpetrator/priest, but the overall diocesan entity which supervises and employees the perpetrator. Closely aligned to duty is the concept of vicarious liability by virtue of respondeat superior. Typically, church defendants resist any suggestion that they might ultimately be held liable for the sexual abuses of their employees, agents or servants. In doing so, they completely reject any factual assertion that they knew or had any reason to know that they had permitted known sexual offenders access to children under their supervision.

            Preparing a case on behalf of parents is similar in many respects to one on behalf of those who are sexually abused. The relationship between the parent, victim, perpetrator and church organization must be studied in detail to uncover possible transfers of the perpetrator. In addition, prior complaints, witness lists produced through the Official Catholic Directory, as well as the relationship between bishop, perpetrator and parishioners as documented in canon law must be considered. But for the cloak of authority granted by the bishops and parishes employing the perpetrators, the minors could not have been victimized. But for the shroud of secrecy cast by church authorities in connection with their attempts to conceal crimes of their employees or volunteers, the crimes could not have happened.

            In the words of one parent, "how could I be suspicious, I was proud that a Roman Catholic priest was taking his own time to be with my son. I felt privileged." What is important to note is that the "grooming" so necessary to accomplish the unlawful sexual contact of a minor is by definition within the scope of a priest's employment. Unfortunately, the celibate faithful priest acts no differently in this period of contact than those priests who wish to sexually exploit a minor. It would be foolhardy to ignore the importance of trust as the fulcrum upon which illicit sex and secrecy lie.

            Presuming the parents' relationship with the perpetrator and the overall parish and diocese is close, regular and involved, support for the parents' independent claim can be garnered from several cases which found diocesan liability. In Does 1-9 v. Compcare, Inc., 52 Wash. App. 688, 695, 763 P.2d 1237, 1242 (1988), the Washington Court of Appeals considered that matter of victims of sexual abuse committed by Roman Catholic priest of a Louisiana diocese.

            In Does 1-9, defendant diocese placed its priest-pedophile in a Washington Jesuit facility in order to keep him away from young people in Louisiana and to avoid exposure while other litigation was pending there. The Louisiana diocese paid his treatment and living expenses while he remained in Washington, purportedly serving non-priestly functions, since his priestly duties had been suspended. While in Washington, further sexual abuse occurred and litigation ensued.

            The Louisiana diocese defended the case on the legal point that the sexual abuse was outside the scope of employment as a priest. The court rejected that argument invoking as authority the Code of Canon Law.

           "The Diocese's argument ignores the scope of the relationship which existed between the Diocese            and its priest. The duty of obedience which [defendant] owed the Diocese encompassed all phases            of his life and correspondingly the Diocese's authority over its cleric went beyond the customary            employer/employee relationship. See Code of Canon Law, Canons 265, 273, 290, 1333, 1350,            1395 (1985)". Does 1-9, supra, at p.1242.

            The most recent case to go to trial in the continuing sexual abuse scandal of the Roman Catholic Church was the case of Michael Hutchison v. Father Francis Luddy and Bishop James Hogan of the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown. There, a jury returned a compensatory verdict of $569,000, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. What is interesting about the award which was upheld in post-trial motions by Judge Hiram Carpenter on March 14, 1995, was that the defendant-perpetrator, Father Francis Luddy, was assessed $50,000 in punitive damages while the diocese was assessed $1,000,000 in punitive damages. They were based upon the jury interrogatory noted by the trial court in its opinion denying post-trial motions:

           "Do you find that Bishop Hogan and/or the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown had a policy or practice            of ignoring or failing to investigate or otherwise handle claims that priests assigned within the diocese            engaged in pedophiliac activities with minor males"?

            The above jury interrogatory was answered in the affirmative. Judge Carpenter, in specifically addressing a portion of the evidence, noted the following:

           "Additionally, there was introduced at trial a letter from Msgr. Madden dated as far back as            February 17, 1975, which discusses Father Luddy's behavior, in particular, his drinking problem, his            hit-and-run car accidents, and a 'deeper malaise'. Father Luddy was immediately transferred to St.            Therese's. This letter alone, even without all of the other evidence in this case, supports an inference            that Bishop Hogan and the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown had knowledge that Father Luddy was            engaging in conduct unbecoming a priest and/or acting in a manner dangerous to others. That also            supports plaintiff's assertion if this deeper malaise was sexually deviant behavior that priests were            transferred if they became sexually involved with boys and that he (plaintiff) was a victim of this            policy. Thus, a factual question is properly raised for the jury as to the extent of the church            defendants' actual knowledge as well as what they should have known". (Emphasis supplied).

            Further, to counsel's knowledge, no other Appellate Court has yet had the opportunity to rule on the issue in the context of the employer's de facto policy of fostering, ignoring, facilitating or concealing sexual abuse as part of a larger pattern and conspiracy. The Texas courts are considering a similar scenario in Doe v. Kos, et al., No. 93-05258-G, District Court of Dallas County, 134th Judicial District and the same is true in New Jersey in the case of Smith et al vs. McIntyre and Bishop James T. McHugh et al, Docket No. ATL-L-004059-94, Superior Court, Atlantic County.

            Notwithstanding the church's general position of shock at being called upon to account for the crimes of their employees, duties arising from the dangerous propensities of one's employees are not particularly new. See Bennett v. T&F Distribution Co., 117 N.J. 441 (App. Div. 1971), cert. den. 60 N.J. 350 (1971). The defense argument can be generally summarized with the common law principle that absent a duty, one cannot be liable. The argument is an old maxim and has certain appeal, however, represents a gross over-simplification of the issue of the relationship between the parties in these types of cases.

            More to the point, the existence of a duty is "largely a question of fairness or policy. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solutions." Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 N.J. 2, 15 (1991), quoting Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538 (1984).

            These are clearly not minor considerations. Nor are the defendants' duties here modestly limited to run-of-the-mill torts. Instead, the court here, in considering defendants' duty to warn must seriously weigh the question of fairness and policy in connection with the three factors in the context of a world wide emerging scandal.

            The first factor is the relationship between the parties. On one side of the scale, we have the plaintiffs. They are (or were) devout Catholics brought up to revere and respect the Church and all of its agents as Holy and above reproach. The plaintiffs are without dispute engaged in a most sacred fiduciary bond with the defendants. The plaintiffs were children and their families entrusted their physical and spiritual well-being (indeed, entrusting their very souls) to the defendants.

                                    The Power Imbalance - The Laity's View of the Clergy

By tradition, Catholics have been taught to hold priests and bishops in the highest esteem. This attitude of respect is set out by official church teaching on the meaning of the Sacrament of Holy Orders (the priesthood, bishopric and diaconate). The Catechism of the Council of Trent contains statements that summarize the laity's understanding of the priesthood prior to the era of the Vatican Council II:

            In the first place, then, the faithful should be shown how great is the dignity and             excellence of this sacrament considered in its highest degree, the priesthood.

            Bishops and priests being, as they are, God's interpreters and ambassadors, empowered in             his name to teach mankind the divine law and the rules of conduct and holding, as they             do, His place on earth, it is evident that no nobler function than theirs can be imagined.             Justly therefore are they called not only Angels, but even gods, because of the fact that             they exercise in our midst the power and prerogatives of the immortal God.

            In all ages priests have been held in the highest honor; yet the priests of the New             testament far exceed all others. For the power of consecrating and offering the body and             blood of our Lord and of forgiving sins, which has been conferred on them, not only has             nothing equal or like it on earth, but even surpasses human reason and understanding.             (The Catechism of the Council and Trent, translated by McHugh and Callan, 1923). (Emphasis             supplied).

            It is this precise issue of respect and trust that is so fundamental into manipulating a victim into sexual contact that it cannot be ignored.

            Sexual contact between clergy and minors-parishioners does not fall within the category of voluntary relationships between individuals. There is a disproportionate distribution of power in the clergy-parishioner relationship and this is the precise reason why victims and their families have been so grievously injured. The widely used analogy characterizing the priest as the shepherd and the parishioners as his flock, attest to the disproportion of power between the two parties. The priest oftentimes is not only a very close family friend, but one who is revered and honored by a victim's parents. The priest is the congregation's leader, thus his position at the altar; while the parishioner is the follower, who places his respect and trust in the clergyman. The defendant-perpetrator's role as emotional and spiritual leader of various parishioners with whom victims had contact also heightens the power imbalance, making the parishioner more vulnerable and dependent upon the relationship with the perpetrator. This type of reverence is common knowledge within the church, and indeed because the bishop is also aware of a close and all-pervasive relationship between himself and his priests, the bishop can hardly absolve himself of responsibility for what a cleric under his authority does, whether the action takes place while the priest is actually performing ministerial duties such as performing the liturgy, or not. The issue is treated in the canons:

            The diocesan bishop is to attend to the presbyters (priests) with special concern and listen to them             as his assistants and advisors; he is to protect their rights and see to it that they correctly fulfill the             obligations proper to their state and that means which institutions they need are available to them to             foster their spiritual and intellectual life; . . . Canon 384.

            Thus, in evaluating the bishop's obligation to personally investigate and take action when an accusation of sexual abuse is made, we have two canonical imperatives at work; the first is the bishop's obligation to show concern for all of the faithful priests and parishioners and the second is the bishop's obligation to see to it that the priests observe their obligations in regard to chastity. A third consideration is no less important and that is the obligation to investigate the allegation of a serious canonical crime.

            In the Code there is a section dealing with penal law. There is a specific crime mentioned which deals with offenses by priests against the law of celibacy.

            "Apart from the case mentioned in can. 1394 [attempted marriage], a cleric living in concubinage,             and a cleric who continues in some other external sin against the sixth commandment of the             Decalogue which causes scandal, is to be punished with suspension. To this end other penalties can             progressively be added if after a warning he persists in the offense, until eventually he can be             dismissed from the clerical state.

            A cleric who has offended in other ways against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue, if the             crime was committed by force, or by threats, or in public, or with a minor under the age of sixteen             years, is to be punished with just penalties, not excluding dismissal from the clerical state if the case             so warrants." (canons 1395)

            The Code, in the same section on penal law, contains canons which outline the manner with which an allegation is to be investigated. If there is reason to believe that a canonical crime was committed, there is also procedure to be followed for a judicial examination with the possible application of penalties.

                                                The Bishop's Relationship to His Priests

            The canonical relationship of a priest or cleric to his bishop or religious superior is a key area for discovery in pursuing abuse cases in the civil courts. If it is obvious that a cleric or a church volunteer did indeed sexually abuse a person, then the next question that follows surrounds the responsibility of his superiors for his actions. In most cases this question is referred to a cleric's bishop, the one ultimately responsible for him, and his more immediate superiors such as his pastor or the rectors and directors of the seminary wherein he studies or has studied. In spite of what the civil law or civil agencies may consider being the relationship of a priest to the church and/or to his bishop, the canon law and general discipline of the church is fairly clear on the fact that it is a very close, all inclusive relationship.

            The Catholic Church is hierarchical in its power structure. All power rests with the Pope. In each diocese, the bishop possesses complete power within the limitations of the law. He must exercise this power in union with the pope and according to the law. Those who have positions inferior to the bishop in the diocesan administration act, for the most part, on delegated power and not on their own. Thus vicars etc. are responsible to the bishop and he in turn, is responsible for their actions.

                         The Responsibilities of a Bishop Toward the Persons in His Diocese

            The canons of the Code and the documents of Vatican II as well as other related documents (canonical and theological) all refer to the relationship of the bishop to his diocese in all-encompassing and intimate terms. The bishop has vast powers within his diocese. His overall obligation is that of the spiritual nurture of all people entrusted to him, both clergy and laity. This is made clear in the canon which describes the meaning of a diocese:

            "A diocese is a portion of the people of God, which is entrusted to a Bishop to be nurtured by him,             with the cooperation of the presbyterium, in such a way that, remaining close to its pastor and             gathered by him through the gospel and the Eucharist in the Holy Spirit, it constitutes a particular             Church . . . " (Canon 369)

Note: Presbyterium is a Latin phrase which means the priests of the diocese.

            Concomitant with the powers of the diocesan bishop the law also sets forth a great deal of responsibility towards those entrusted to him. Although he acts through his priests as well as others who fulfill various diocesan offices, the bishop has primary responsibility and obligation in all areas.

            "In exercising his pastoral office, the diocesan bishop is to be solicitous for all Christ's             faithful entrusted to his care, whatever their age, condition or nationality., whether they live             in the territory or are visiting there . . . " (Canon 383, par 1)

            "The diocesan bishop is bound to teach and to illustrate to the faithful the truths of faith             which are to be believed and applied to behavior. He is himself to preach frequently. He is             also to ensure that the canons on the ministry of the word, especially on the homily and             catechetical instruction, are faithfully observed, so that the whole of Christian teaching is             transmitted to all." (Canon 386, par. 1)

            The bishop is obliged to visit all of the people of the diocese. This is done by being with them to celebrate the Mass (canon 389) and by visiting the parishes (canon 396, par 1).

            Although a parish, the local entity to which Catholics belong as members of the Church, is normally under the authority of a priest as its pastor, the canons state that the pastoral care of the parish (i.e., the people in the parish), is under the authority of the bishop who entrusts the care of the parish to a priest (canon 515, par. 1).

            The section of the Code dealing with the obligations and rights of all of the faithful (Title 1, canons 208-231) refers to a number of rights enjoyed by the faithful in general (clerics and laity) and the laity in particular. Whenever the Code uses the term "Pastor" in the context of these canons, it refers not to the priest who is the pastor of a parish, but to the bishop. Here we see then, more of the bishop's responsibilities towards his people.

Canon 213 is a kind of general canons which states "Christ's faithful have the right to be assisted by their pastors from the spiritual riches of the Church, especially by the Word of God and the sacraments." The particular reference here is to spiritual matters. However, the spiritual riches include the right to assistance in time of need and quality pastoral care from pastoral ministers, especially those who are ordained (priests and deacons) among other things.

            By contrast, defendants are the trusted fiduciaries, who breached that trust in the most outrageous and unholy manner. These are fiduciaries who conspired to conceal sexual abuse of the plaintiffs and to defraud them and their families allegedly rooted in their fear of scandal..

            The breach of any fiduciary relationship is a serious matter, particularly since it typically affects parties who are in unequal positions. This would, of course, include the parents. The confidential and fiduciary nature of the relationship of the devout and the clergy is recognized by the courts. See e.g. Erickson, supra and Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993). The essential nature of the fiduciary relationship is also found in canon law.

            The second factor the court must consider is the nature of the risk. The risk is great. It is not an understatement to suggest that the on-going, long-term risks associated with intentionally or recklessly placing known or suspected sexual offenders in schools, churches and church youth groups are abundant and obvious.

            Foreseeability is the touchstone of duty. "The foreseeability essential to the creation of a legal duty... focuses on whether [defendant] should have foreseen that its conduct unreasonably enhanced a hazard that would be injurious to those coming in range of such a hazard." Johnson v. Usdin, 248 N.J. Super. 525, 529 (App. Div. 1991)(No duty existed where employee stole acid from employer and injured family members).

            Pleadings must allege that the risk of harm which actually occurred was not only foreseeable, but probable. The complaint must be specific on the point that the defendants created the atmosphere of tolerance to the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents. Unlike Johnson, where there was no evidence other than defendant's employee committed a random act of violence, plaintiffs here specifically recite facts suggesting willful, knowing and reckless conduct by defendants in connection with known pedophiles being placed among children. The risk was great and abundantly foreseeable.

                                                                 Apparent Authority

            Many cases involve volunteers committing acts of sexual abuse. Thus, the analysis begins with the principle that once a volunteer undertakes an act, he is liable for misfeasance or malfeasance in its performance. O'Neill v. Suburban Terr. Apts., Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 541, 545 (App. Div. 1970).

            There is little distinction between a volunteer employee and a paid employee. For example, in Doe v. Roman Catholic Church for Archdiocese of New Orleans, 615 So.2d 410 (La. 1993), the minor plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a volunteer youth group leader. Defendant claimed that its volunteer leader was not an employee. The court of appeals observed that the church's liability turned upon its right to control the volunteer's activities as such.

           "The right of the Church to control is a question of fact, determined by the following questions: (1) the degree of contact between the charity and the volunteer, (2) the degree to which the charity orders the volunteer to perform specific actions, and (3) the structural hierarchy of the charity". 615 So.2d at 414. The court reversed in part and affirmed in part, inter alia, finding that the jury could reasonably have found that the volunteer was not employer's servant, since the record was devoid of evidence concerning the structural hierarchy and the extent to which the church had ordered the volunteer to perform specific duties.

            There is abundant authority in the various states holding employers vicariously liable for the offenses of their employees. Most impose liability on the theory that the employee's misconduct was within the scope of employment. Some find that even sexual abuse is within the scope of employment for purposes of vicarious liability, if it is incident to or arises from the employment. See e.g. John Does 1-9, supra (Wash.); Erickson, supra, (Ore.); Doe v. Samaritan, supra (Alaska).

            Other courts have found vicarious liability for acts which might otherwise be outside the scope of employment, but would not have happened, but for the employment. The "but for" test is typically coupled with some analysis of the degree of control exercised by the employer or the acts of the employer to provide the presumptive or apparent authority or means for the commission of the tort.

            In Turner v. State, 494 So.2d 1292 (La. App. 1986) defendant employee was a recruiting officer for the defendant national guard. In his capacity as a recruiting officer, defendant falsely represented to plaintiffs that he was authorized to conduct physical examinations. Defendant national guard argued, inter alia that the acts of its employee were conducted purely for his own gratification and were thus outside the scope of employment.

            Applying a test similar to the Restatement test, the court rejected this argument. The court observed, "If the tortious conduct of the employee is so closely connected in time, place, and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer's business, as compared with conduct motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer's interests, it can then be regarded as within the scope of the employee's employment, so that the employer is liable in tort to third persons injured thereby." 494 So.2d at 1295.

           "The scope of risks attributable to an employer increases with the amount of authority and freedom of action granted to the servant in performing his assigned tasks." Samuels v. Southern Baptist, 594 So.2d 571, 573 (La. App. 1992).

            A principal is vicariously liable for the torts of its agents when acting within the scope of his employment or when the principal has cloaked him with apparent authority. Liberty Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Builders Square, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1438, 1445 (E.D. Mich. 1992). See also, Select Creations, Inc., v. Paliafito America, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Wis. 1993).

            Even if a person is not a de jure agent of the principal, he may become a de facto agent by virtue of apparent authority. Of particular importance is whether a third party has relied upon the apparent authority. Further, "a court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an agency relationship existed even though the principal did not have direct control over the agent." Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 338 (1993).

            Thus, the principal may be liable to injured third parties for the misrepresentations of the agent outside the scope of employment, if the agent has such apparent authority. The principal is liable even if the agent was acting entirely for his own purposes. Am. Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 555, 565-566, 102 S.Ct. 1935, 1942 (1982).

            Similarly, the scope of employment may be expanded where the employee uses his employer's facilities, equipment and carries his employer's indicia of authority. This is true even if the employer derives no benefit from the employee's acts and the acts are in fact prohibited.

            In White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal. App.3d 566, 571, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493, 496 (Cal. App. 1985) the court held that the complaint had stated a cause action for vicarious liability under respondeat superior for sexual assault by a sheriff's deputy. The court found that the county had cloaked the employee with the indicia of authority by virtue of his uniform, badge, gun and patrol car. But for the employee's status as an employee-- police officer, plaintiff would not have stopped at his request and would not therefore have been assaulted.

            The court quoted the Restatement (2d), Agency (1958) thus: "If the principal places the agent in a position to defraud, and the third person relies upon his apparent authority to make the representations, the principal is liable even though the agent was acting for his own purposes.'" "'It is immaterial that the principal receives no benefits from the transaction."

            See also, Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(Defendant could be vicariously liable where plaintiff was raped by defendant's deliveryman). Defendant argued that employee's act was beyond the scope of employment. The court observed that but for the employment as a deliveryman, the assault would not have happened. Further, "It is a jury's job to decide how much of plaintiff's story to believe, and how much if any of the damages were caused by actions, including sexual assault, which stemmed for job-related sources rather than from purely personal origins."

            It is thus possible, under the Restatement view, for employers to be liable for the acts of their employees outside the scope of employment so long as the employer has acted or failed to act as described in §219(2). This provision is the law of New Jersey and provides that employers are subject to liability for employees' torts outside the scope of employment if:

           "(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
            (b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
            (c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
            (d) the servant purported to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent                  authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation."

            Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 619, 620 (1993) (emphasis supplied); See also Bouton v. BMW of No.Amer., 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3d. Cir. 1994).

            Each complaint should specifically allege that the defendants are vicariously liable for the criminal conduct of the perpetrators consistent with §219(2) insofar as the acts fall into each of the listed criteria. For example, it is specifically alleged that, consistent with (d), the perpetrators purported to speak on behalf of their employers and that the plaintiffs (especially any minor plaintiffs) were, by virtue of their age and their religious training, were unable to do anything but rely upon the apparent authority of the perpetrator's employers. (See discussion of the relationship of the laity to their clergy at page 13 et seq).

            Further, the same section (d) establishes a but for test. Allegations in any complaint should include facts that the perpetrators were not merely aided in their heinous acts by the existence of the agency relation; rather, the agency relationship did much more than aid these offenses; they actuated and made them possible. But for the existence of the agency relation the offenses could not have occurred.

            Next, consider 219(2)(a)[the master intended the conduct or consequence]; It is certainly a question of fact whether the defendants intended the criminal conduct constituting sexual abuse. However, it is also perfectly clear that the consequences, e.g. the pattern of fraud and concealment to further the continuing flow of contributions and tuitions, avoidance of negative publicity, were in fact, intended by the employer-defendants. Consistent with (b) and (c), the amended complaint specifically alleges negligence and recklessness and a beach of defendants' non-delegable duty to safeguard the children entrusted to them.

            The perpetrators here were at all times acting within the scope of their employment, however that employment might be defined. The scope of employment can, under these facts, subsume sexual abuse where abuse is known to and tolerated by the employers by virtue of prior complaints. The scope of employment may also reach tortious and criminal conduct of the employees when such conduct is so intimately related to the employment that it is actuated or facilitated by such employment. The scope of employment also includes criminal and tortious conduct where the employer has acted in such a manner as to clothe the employees with the appearance or indicia of authority.

            Irrespective of the scope of employment argument, the church authorities are nevertheless vicariously liable for the torts of their employees acting with apparent authority. A sound argument can be made that, by virtue of the church's actions and inactions, they willfully, recklessly and negligently clothed the perpetrators with the employers' mantle of apparent authority. The employer provided the perpetrators with the place and means of committing their offenses.

                                                                   Practice Pointers

            In any claim for an adult survivor of sexual abuse or the parents of that survivor, careful consideration should be given to a tolling agreement for both parties. Tolling agreements are long-employed by commercial, regulatory and insurance lawyers to suspend the running of the Statute of Limitations or Repose are finding increasing usefulness for sexual abuse claims due to the judiciary willingness to apply delayed discovery principles to sexual abuse occurring years before the claim is filed.

           Adult survivors of early childhood sexual abuse and their families are pursuing their legal remedies in ever-increasing numbers. As a result, practice in this area of tort law has become emotionally charged for both the attorney and the client, presenting daunting procedural issues, social policy arguments and expensive factual investigation. The sexual assault of a minor in our culture causes profound alienation and isolation for the victim and his immediate family. Its illicitness consigns the survivors of sexual abuse to unhealthy secrecy and pseudo-maturity. Many survivors turn away from family and peers only to be embraced by sadness and depression. That the sexual violation could be accomplished by an earthly representative of God makes trust - of anyone - on any level - impossible. One aspect of this practice area is clear and that is that words really do fail to describe the isolation, loneliness and pain caused by childhood sexual abuse. When a mentor figure is a priest or relative of the victim's parents, the injury to the family unit is compounded. Many at the bar have no personal reference point to such a tragedy, however, there are some maxims that everyone can agree on: The sexual exploitation of a child by another person in the family or one who stands before the child in a parental or almost Godlike role invested with significant intimacy and authority, is a crime of immense proportion. It is an assault on the human spirit and should be compensated by wrongdoers, if at all possible. The nuances of procedure and case law require the utmost care for both the lawyer and his client. The struggle to survive from childhood sexual abuse is fraught with difficulty and mystery. The same can be said for a parents' realization that their family priest has committed such an egregious act. Many cases will be turned away, but our job is to provide the client with the best advice, not only as to what the law is, but also to what the law ought to be. Extensive factual and directed investigation as to the relationships between priests and parishioners will act as a threshold which either embraces that wonderful feeling of reclaiming a portion of a child's lost innocence and its concomitant damage to the family, or a rational closure which bespeaks the old adage that the law cannot provide a remedy for every wrong.
 
 

            Adults survivors of early childhood sexual abuse are pursuing their legal remedies in ever-increasing numbers. As a result, practice in this area of tort law has become emotionally charged for both the attorney and the client, presenting daunting procedural issues, social policy arguments and expensive factual investigation. Tolling agreements long-employed by commercial, regulatory and insurance lawyers to suspend the running of a statute of limitation or repose are finding increasing usefulness for sexual abuse claims due to the judiciary's willingness to apply delayed discovery principles to sexual abuse occurring years before the claim is filed.

            It is clear that courts will enforce agreements which contractually alter the statute of limitations when a properly drafted agreement so provides. There are no special formalities for a tolling agreement to be effective and as such must simply pass muster under a traditional contract analysis. Consideration must flow from the defendant obtaining the benefit of the agreement not to plead the statute of limitation. Typically a claimant's forbearance in the bringing of his cause of action is sufficient, but it would not be uncommon for the cautious attorney to promise to pay a nominal additional consideration, receipt of which is recited in the agreement. There is no reported case that would require that strict construction. In one very limited situation, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that tolling agreements are not enforceable, if it conflicts with a limitation period provided for by federal statute and that the remedy in question was express rather than implied.

            The jurisdictions where tolling agreements for sexual abuse are frequently employed follow closely those states that have codified delayed discovery jurisprudence into a specific tort for sexual abuse or where courts have specifically held that an action for sexual abuse does not accrue until the victim knew or should have known that the physical or psychological sequelae suffered was a result of the abuse. These claims can be readily divided into two types of cases. The first group involves survivors who recall the abuse, but are unaware that their current or past psychiatric sequelae is the result of childhood or adolescent trauma in the form of sexual abuse. While the earlier trend of these cases rarely allowed the discovery rule to be applied to toll the statute, recent legislative enactments and judicial expansion of claims for sexual abuse has created a more hospitable climate. For example, in New Jersey the Legislature in 1994 specifically acknowledged in the committee notes that "because of the unique nature of sexual abuse, which may only be discovered by an adult victim after years of repression . . . a civil suit for sexual abuse shall accrue at the time of reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act of sexual abuse." In addition, the pertinent section of the statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(5)(b) and (c) provides as follows:

            In any civil action for injury or illness based on sexual abuse, the cause of action shall accrue at the             time of reasonable discovery of the injury and its causal relationship to the act of sexual abuse. Any             such action shall be brought within two years after reasonable discovery. (Emphasis supplied.)
            Nothing in this act is intended to preclude the court from finding that the statute of limitations was             tolled in a case because of plaintiff's mental state, duress by defendant, or any other equitable             grounds. Such a finding shall be made after a plenary hearing, conducted in the presence of a jury.             At the plenary hearing the court shall hear all credible evidence and the rules of evidence shall not             apply, except for Rule 4 or a valid claim of privilege. The court may order an independent             psychiatric evaluation of the plaintiff in order to assist in the determination as to whether the statute             of limitations was tolled.

            The second group of cases that apply the delayed discovery principles are when the abuse itself creates a coping mechanism that allows the survivor to disassociate their conscious awareness and memory from the unspeakable, to such an extent, that memory of the events is repressed partially or in some cases in its entirety. It is clear that more and more courts are recognizing the historical frequency of incest and childhood sexual abuse in our culture. That being so, Appellate judges are wisely urging trial courts to cobble a detailed factual record so that delayed discovery decisions can rest on a thorough analysis of the factual record or a case by case basis. Notwithstanding the practical difficulties in corroborating and in some cases verifying the accuracy of revived memories, the courts in these cases have been facile in vigorously expressing the rationale which balances the public policy of providing adult survivors a remedy, against a perpetrator's arguments that there should be protection from uncorroborated and stale claims. If possible, appellate courts seem willing to apply the rule of delayed discovery in cases of incest and sexual abuse so that the claimant can be provided an opportunity before a jury to bring forward the truth of the allegations.

                     PRACTICE CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE TOLLING AGREEMENT

            Before contemplating the terms of a tolling agreement for an adult survivor of sexual abuse, the practitioner should give the client a reasonable assessment as to whether the action would be time-barred under a delayed discovery analysis in the particular jurisdiction. The point bespeaks the obvious, however, the tolling assessment requires significant time and energy in collecting a factual record. The process can only be achieved by taking a complete medical/psychological history and reviewing all available therapy notes. The process is costly and time consuming, but is absolutely critical to the successful representation of an adult survivor of sexual abuse. Careful probing of the client is required here. A full repression case versus a semiconscious dissociative case emanates from two completely different theoretical platforms. Frequently lawyers have accepted the client's understanding of repression (typically garnered from support group meetings and the like) without an objective review of the factual underpinnings contained in therapeutic notes or other reporting. Forcing clients to look back over the years post abuse will reveal the legal issues to be faced during motion practice on the statute.

            Interviews of over 300 clergy abuse survivors are marked by their similarities in how the abuse occurred. It is a myth that the predator concentrates on homes where there is only a single parent. While that frequently occurs, it is the parent(s) response to the increased attention of the priest that is key in the perpetrators decision to continue the "grooming" process. The perpetrator is either approaching the family unit as a trusted and loyal friend beyond reproach, often officiating at family religious functions such as baptisms, confirmations and weddings, or a welcome relief to a single parent that their child, in need of supervision, is certainly safe with a priest and is pleased that a man of God would take time with their offspring. The perpetrator in these situations artfully manipulates the power dynamics that our culture recognizes in clergy, thus shielding their crimes from disclosure.

            As a result of early childhood trauma and emerging symptoms, adult survivors frequently undertake psychotherapy years before the perpetrator is or can be revealed, further delaying the survivors recognition and causal effect of injury. The trauma sustained by children, developing adolescents and surviving adults, can affect all aspects of life and over the years cause a callosal drain on energies - physical, intellectual, psychic and spiritual. For the survivor, this kind of overriding, comprehensive assault translates into lost opportunity, a condition that is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to measure, but nevertheless warrants sophisticated legal representation. The sexual and spiritual assault of a child constitutes a violation of trust more profound than any violation of body. Mental health experts reporting in the literature on sexual abuse identify a wide array of presenting symptoms typically centered around substance abuse, promiscuity, in a personal conflict, eating disorders, aggressive behavior, failed adult relationships or depression. Many clients will report self loathing and feel that somehow they attracted the abuse and it is their fault. Others retreat to narcissistic displays of sexually acting out, many abused children are besieged by nightmares that continue well into adulthood. They cannot bear to touch or be touched. They shut down emotionally, which makes intimacy impossible. Parents and other mentors who, under normal "circumstances" would help establish and reinforce self-esteem, are shut out by these children and in many cases are replaced by drugs, alcohol, or mental illness. Some survivors drop out of society completely, while others turn inward to draw on their talents and heal successfully. Whatever the outcome, there is always the tragedy of innocence lost through assault and exploitation.

            The spectrum of clinical note taking varies from taped interviews to no notes at all. Since the function of a tolling agreement is to preserve the status quo as to rights or defenses on the effective date of the agreement, a limitations assessment is impossible without clinical notes detailing the history of reporting. The full repression case presents a much more fluid tolling analysis presuming there is no therapeutic history discussing the abuse or any other reporting. Close questioning on the client with regard to reporting to parents, siblings, ex-spouses, close friends and other clergy, or to the perpetrator himself, is strongly suggested. Frequently in cases involving females, you will find large amounts of apparently innocent correspondence and greeting cards which obliquely refers to the "close relationship" or "special relationship." Assuming no reporting exists, counsel should be quick to identify the timing of the triggering event that began recall and seek out a referral for an effective mental health regimen since it is reasonable to expect the client to be severely retraumatized by the continuing "revictimization" that is inherent in the litigation crucible. Clients should be regularly advised of this phenomena and the attorney should confirm that a effective support system is in place since virtually every contact a lawyer will have with the client will be perceived as a negative contact from the past, typically expressed by emotional upset.

            The dissociative case with memory of the abuse presents a much more challenging assessment. Issues of duress, shame, guilt, threats and perceived complicity on the part of the client must be explored in detail. This period of time typically occupies several years and is often complicated by the array of symptoms noted above. Care should be given to ferret out other causes for the presently mental illness so as to be able to distinguish from a proximate cause standard that which was caused by sexual abuse versus those mental conditions exacerbated by the sexual abuse or caused by a wholly different entity.

                                                     DRAFTING THE AGREEMENT

            It would not be uncommon for the practitioner faced with a fast approaching statute of limitation to be the last of a series of attorneys consulted with regard to the filing of a claim for sexual abuse. Careful questioning of the client may reveal that the search for an attorney willing to take the case exceeds the statutory limit in your particular jurisdiction under any delayed discovery rationale. Without this sometimes uncomfortable screening, an attorney can become an unwitting victim of a sanction award once suit is filed after the expiration of a tolling agreement. The attorney-client privilege would not protect from discovery the fact that the client sought advice on a legal claim involving the perpetrator; in most if not all jurisdictions only the contents of the communication is protected. While perhaps not dispositive in motion proceedings on the tolling of the statute, the mere seeking of advice from an attorney on the viability of a claim is powerful, albeit circumstantial, evidence that the client knew or should have known that their injuries were causally related to the original abuse. The first task in drafting the agreement is the proper identification of the parties. For example, in an incest setting, certain parties other than the perpetrator may be within the umbrella of liability. It is not uncommon for other family members or physicians to be aware of the abuse and thus be subject to statutory reporting obligations. The presence of homeowner's insurance from a non-perpetrating spouse of the insured may also be implicated. The same could be said for a host of treatment professionals, clergy, teachers, physicians or any other person who acquires knowledge of the abuse, but fails to discharge their responsibilities under the reporting statutes in a particular jurisdiction. Another class of potential parties to a tolling agreement are the employers of the perpetrator and possibly treatment professionals of the perpetrator involving those clergy who were returned to ministry prior to your client's assault. These corporate entities are unable to bind their individual employees or patients to a tolling agreement without their consent, however, counsel should recognize that the source of eventual recovery is frequently based on negligence theories involving failure to supervise or a breach of fiduciary duty, thus calling into play the effect of comparative negligence and joint and several liability legislation in your jurisdiction. The finding of employer liability for intentional tort rests soundly on principles of respondeat superior. The decisions vary widely among jurisdictions and is beyond the scope of this note. Frequently, decisions turn on subtle variations and the trial court's understanding of when an employee is acting within the scope of his employment. Cases in one jurisdiction which clearly place outside the scope of employment of sexual abuse may in turn create liability in another jurisdiction when the initial contact which led to the sexual abuse was within the scope of employment. Consider the following hypothetical.

            An adult survivor one month within the statute comes to you with a four-year history of sexual abuse during her adolescence. At the time of the client interview there does not appear to be any evidence that the employing diocese had any prior complaints against the priest involving sexual misconduct. Two weeks prior to your first interview, the client reported the abuse to the police who in turn opened an investigative file. The alleged perpetrator is still in active ministry and is possessed of few, if any, assets. The perpetrator is represented by counsel who refuses any participation in a tolling agreement and refuses to give any statement to the police. The diocese is willing to enter into a tolling agreement insisting that any action against it would be frivolous and will be pursued under its State's sanction statute. Your research in the annual volumes of the Official Catholic Directory yields a disturbing pattern of multiple transfers of the alleged perpetrator (nine out of 13 years of ministry) and two years listed on sick leave. Your client has been in several rehabilitative facilities for alcoholism and prescription drug dependency. She is married twice, and divorced twice. She is 30 years old and had her first psychotherapeutic contact when she was 17, the last year of abuse. She reports "that the first person told about the abuse was her father's personal counsel, nearly two years ago." While the tolling agreement is perfectly appropriate for the diocese preserving all the claims, time and lack of discovery prevents lack of identification of other potential defendants. A savings action must be filed within time or run the risk of being barred. If John Doe practice is permitted in your jurisdiction plead in any treatment officials, who may have been part of the decision to return the perpetrator to active ministry. In the event that the perpetrator elects to embrace the protective mantle of the Fifth Amendment shielding any forced "testimony," counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case should be aware that discovery requests that remain unanswered can be awarded sanctions, including substantive admissions against the interests of the perpetrator and perhaps other co-conspirators. In NJ Division of Youth and Family Services v. S.S. and V.E., 275 N.J. Super. 173 (App.Div.1994), the court concluded that while a defendant may be faced with a very difficult decision, the Constitution's protection is limited to the individual's right not to answer any questions put to him in any proceeding, civil or criminal, if those answers may incriminate the defendant in a future criminal proceeding. Here, Family Services sought an action to declare two children abused and neglected. The trial court after hearing particularly virulent testimony concerning the minors' sexual and physical abuse while under the care and custody of the natural mother and stepfather, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to make out a prima facia case, thus triggering New Jersey's burden-shifting procedure. Both S.S. and V.E. testified and thereafter the judge found that both had caused and/or permitted the abuse and neglect of the minor child. As a result of the testimony, the judge removed the children from the custody of their natural mother. The defendant appealed that the burden-shifting requirements violated her privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The court at page 180 noted the following:

            That the respondent's do not wish to assume this burden, this fact by itself does not make the             presumption unconstitutional. There is no mandatory requirement that they take the stand and testify.             That would be unconstitutional. The constraint upon respondent to give testimony arises here simply             from the force of circumstances and not from any form of compulsion forbidden by the Constitution.             . . . It may be a difficult decision for the respondents and their attorneys. [But] it is a question of             procedure and legal options for the defense, not one that the constitutionality of incrimination . . .             The respondents here have a right to stand mute. If they do so, however, in this type of case, they             run the great risk of having the prima facia case . . . stand against them with finality.

(See N.J. Super. 173, at page 180).

            It is suggested that a key element in pursuing both the tolling analysis as well as employer liability is a keen understanding of the psychological phenomena of transference. Typically that principle is found in psychiatric malpractice cases involving sexual abuse, but has equal application to any sexual abuse committed by a parent, teacher, or clergy member. If the psychological phenomena of transference has occurred, the survivor will not have the same emotional response to sexual contact with a clergy member that he or she would have had to sexual contact with other persons. Transference can occur in any relationship where there is a significant degree of trust, confidence or good faith reposed in the person in the position of relative authority. One of the earliest cases to discuss the phenomena of transference was Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (MO.1968) (en banc). While in many cases mishandling of transference leads to inappropriate and sometimes illegal sexual contact with a patient, negligent transference can occur without sexual contact. The Zipkin court noted that very point at page 761 of their opinion:

            Once Dr. Freeman started to mishandle the transference phenomena,. . . . it was inevitable that             trouble was ahead. It is pretty clear from the medical evidence that the damage would have been             done to Mrs. Zipkin even if the trips outside the state were carefully chaperoned, the swimming             done with suits on, and if there had been ballroom dancing instead of sexual relations.

(See also Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d. 1363 (9th Circ.1986).

                                                                    CONCLUSION

            The sexual assault of a minor in our culture causes profound alienation and isolation. Its illicitness consigns the survivor to unhealthy secrecy and pseudo-maturity. Many survivors turn away from family and peers only to be embraced by sadness and depression. That the sexual violation could be by a parent or representative of God makes trust - of anyone - on any level - impossible. Making good use of the time a tolling agreement will provide can be an emotional roller coaster for both lawyer and client. One aspect of this practice area is clear and that is that words really do fail to describe the isolation, loneliness, and pain of sexual abuse by a mentor figure. Many at the bar have no personal reference point to such tragedy, however, there are some maxims that everyone can agree on: the sexual exploitation of a child by another person in the family or one who stands before the child in a parental role invested with significant intimacy and authority is a crime of immense proportion. It is an assault on the human spirit and should be compensated by the wrongdoers, if at all possible. The nuances of procedure and case law require the utmost care for both the lawyer and his client. The struggle to survive from childhood sexual abuse is fraught with difficulty and mystery. For healing to take place, the struggle must be lived through, however loud the soul screams, however great the feelings of spiritual loss. Many cases will be turned away, but our job is to provide the client with the best advice that is available under the law. Tolling agreements act as a threshold which either embraces that wonderful feeling of reclaiming a portion of a client's lost innocence, or a rational closure which bespeaks the old adage that the law cannot provide a remedy for every wrong.
  Index of articles about clergy sexual abuse
recommended reading about clergy sexual abuse